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I. INTRODUCTION
No one likes to be treated unfairly. This fact is no less true in the context
of international trade. As it stands, the United States' response to the so-called
unfair trade practices of China not only appears to be unfair, but may also be
violating U.S. and international law. This is due in no small part to the U.S.
Department of Commerce's (DOC's) recent willingness to impose
countervailing duties (CVDs) on nonmarket economies.' This practice stands
in direct contrast to the DOC' s longstanding policy of refraining from applying
CVDs to nonmarket economies.2 This change in policy presents opportunities
for abuse by the DOC, which finds itself using this new application of an old
trade regulation in a thoroughly protectionist manner, especially in
combination with antidumping duties (ADs). In particular, the DOC's method
of calculating both duties (ADs and CVDs) takes subsidies into account
twice-creating an inherent danger of possible double-counting of these
subsidies. The use of these duties as a protective mechanism is inconsistent
with U.S. and international law, as these duties are meant to be remedial, not
punitive.' These are only a few of the many issues inherent in the nonmarket
economy classification system. The DOC should reconsider its current
position on AD and CVD regulations with regard to nonmarket economies or,
at the very least, use extreme caution when applying these duties to prevent the
occurrence of such abuses.
In Part II, this Note will first examine how ADs and CVDs operate by
exploring the applicable U.S. laws and international agreements under the
World Trade Organization (WTO), showing their development and their
application to nonmarket economies prior to the recent policy change. Part III
will cover the regulatory process, how an application for ADs and CVDs is
processed, and what recourse is available to the target of ADs and CVDs, both
under the WTO and in the U.S. Part IV of this Note will describe the DOC's
1 See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,484,
17,487 (Apr. 9,2007) (amended prelim. determination) (finding a countervailable subsidy in the
coated free sheet paper industry in the People's Republic of China, a nonmarket economy).
2 See Application of the Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from the People's Republic
of China, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,507, 75,507 (Dec. 15, 2006) (request for comments) (noting the
absence of a CVD against China due to the 1986 determination that the DOC "has the discretion
not to apply the [CVD] law to non-market economy countries," as affirmed in Georgetown Steel
Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
' See 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties §§ 136, 146 (2009) (discussing the remedial nature of ADs
and CVDs) [hereinafter C.J.S. Customs Duties].
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recent change of course regarding the application of CVDs to nonmarket
economies, along with the dispute surrounding the DOC's coated free-sheet
paper investigation and the AD and CVD cases currently pending against
China. Part V will analyze the economics and implications of simultaneously
applying ADs and CVDs, with particular emphasis on double counting, and
will explore the inconsistencies between United States and international law.
Part VI will outline the potential remedies that are appropriate and feasible.
Part VII will conclude with a determination of the current best solution to the
inequities of double counting under the DOC's current policy.
II. TRADE DUTIES AND THE REGULATORY REGIME
Trade restrictions may be imposed for many reasons, from national
security4 to consumer protection5 to environmental concerns.6 The regulatory
instruments covered by this Note are AD and CVD laws. These laws aim to
correct any injury to domestic firms caused by foreign unfair pricing or
government subsidies, which create distortions in international trade.7 As
such, the duties imposed by these regulations are meant to correct, such
distortions, not to punish the traders The following Part gives an overview
of AD and CVD regulations under U.S. law and under WTO agreements,
historically and as they stand currently.
See Dunniela Kaufman, Does Security Trump Trade?, 13 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 619 (2007)
(discussing the interaction of security concerns and trade before and after September 11,2001).
5 See, e.g., Tim Bfithe, The Globalization of Health and Safety Standards: Delegation of
Regulatory Authority in the SPS Agreement of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 222-23 (2008) (indicating the use of
non-tariff barriers for consumer protection).
6 See, e.g., Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection
Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 754 (1993) (purporting to justify the use of trade restrictions to
promote environmental protection).
7 See International Trade Administration, Import Administration, http://www.trade.gov/ia/
(last visited Aug. 1, 2010) (stating that this agency's objective is to enforce trade laws and to
mitigate unfair trade practices and protect U.S. industry).
' See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2006) (noting that a CVD should be
assessed "equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy" and mandating that ADs be
imposed in "the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price ... for the
merchandise").
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A. Antidumping Duties
An AD is a tariff imposed on imports "to protect domestic companies" from
the domestic sale of foreign goods at less than fair market value.9 For AD
purposes in the United States, fair market value is determined by the
producer's domestic profit margins-the amount of money a producer makes
from its product in the domestic market-or the cost of producing the
product.' If the profit in the exporting country is larger than the profit in the
importing country, then "dumping" has occurred." An AD acts to prevent
price discrimination between foreign and domestic markets. 2 Dumping also
occurs when the sales price in the importing country is "less than fair value,"
or the cost of production. 3 The determination that dumping has occurred is
the first step toward the imposition of ADs under United States law. 4 Under
U.S. AD law, an AD may not be imposed until it is determined that the
imported foreign goods "are being, or are likely to be, sold ... at less than fair-
market value."' 5 There must also be a determination that a domestic industry
is or is likely to be materially injured, or that an industry's establishment in the
domestic market is "materially retard[ed]," before an AD can be imposed on
an imported good. 6 Before damages can be assessed, there must be proof of
present or potential, material injury to a" 'domestic like product.' "' Further,
such injury, or threat thereof, must be shown to be directly caused by imports
that are the subject of the investigation by the U.S. authorities," though "it is
not necessary that imports be the sole cause, or even a major cause, of the
injury as long as [they are] more than a de minimis factor."' 9  If these
9 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 103, 1495 (8th ed. 2004) (defining antidumping law and
antidumping tariff).
10 See B. Thomas Peele III, US. Trade Law Affecting China After China's Accession to the
WTO, 817 PLI/CoMM 115, 125 (2001) (noting that the cost of'production and profit margins are
the basis for a determination of dumping).
" See id. (noting how profit margins are used to determine whether dumping has occurred).
12 See id. (stating that AD laws amount to "anti-profit-discrimination laws").
" United States International Trade Commission, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Investigations, http://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations].
"' See TariffAct of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006) (laying out the elements necessary for
the imposition of an AD).
15 Id
16 Id
'7 C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, § 151.
18 Id
'9 Id § 152.
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requirements are satisfied, then damages are assessed. 2' The amount of
damages, which takes the form of a duty, is the difference between the "normal
value," or fair market value, and the export price.2' United States customs
officers levy these damages against the importer of the infringing goods.22
ADs are remedial, not punitive in nature;23 accordingly, ADs are not meant to
grant an unfair advantage to domestic industries .24 Thus far the description of
this framework does not capture the legal nuances that have created a situation
ripe for abuse; in order to reach the heart of the problem, one must examine the
DOC's imposition of ADs on nonmarket economies.
Though the imposition ofADs may seem fairly straightforward, the process
becomes complicated when the exporting country has a centralized, or
"command," economy. A command economy exists where a central authority
maintains control over the means of production.25 Complications arise when
evaluating countries with centralized economies because government control
of supply and demand makes price levels difficult to ascertain.26 The United
States classifies these types of economies, generally found in former and
current communist countries, as nonmarket economies.27 If a country is
classified as a nonmarket economy and the normal value of a good cannot be
determined within that market, a constructed value is calculated using the
20 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006).
21 Id.
22 Id; see also C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, § 146 (noting that the duty's remedial
purpose is defeated when it is paid by the exporter rather than the importer).
23 C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, § 146.
24 See id. (noting that AD provisions are meant to "level[ ] the playing field").
25 Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/command+eco
nomy (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
26 See Richard N. Eid, Note, The Effect of Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States on
Nonmarket Economy Imports, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 65, 66 (1988) (discussing the
difficulties of assessing "import relief" against nonmarket or communist economies).
27 See William P. Alford, When Is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of
the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other
'Nonmarket Economy' Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 82-83 (1987) (discussing the
classification of communist countries as nonmarket economies); Christopher F. Corr, The NME
Import Regulation Dilemma: Two Proposals for a New Regulatory Approach, 12 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & CoM. REG. 59, 59-60 (1987) (discussing the historic classification of communist countries
as nonmarket economies); see also Longyue Zhao & Yan Wang, Trade Remedies and Non-
Market Economies: Economic Implications of the First US Countervailing Duty Case on China
12 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4560, 2008), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.orglexternal/defaultlWDSContentServer/IW3PIB/2008/03/17/000158349_2
0080317170532/Rendered/PDF/wps4560.pdf (tracing the origin of nonmarket economy issues
to a 1935 bilateral trade agreement with the Soviet Union).
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value of the inputs for production of the good found in a surrogate country.2 8
Such a surrogate country should operate, to the extent possible, as a market
economy at a comparable level of development, with "significant producers of
comparable merchandise."2 9 Some illustrative factors, or inputs, of production
are labor hours; quantity of raw material; utilities; and the cost of capital.3"
Also incorporated into the factors of production are approximate expenses and
profits.3' The constructed value is then used to determine whether foreign
goods are being sold in the United States at less than fair market value.32 If so,
and if the other factors for imposition of an AD are met, then a duty, or tax,
may be imposed on the goods at a value no greater than the difference between
the constructed value of the good and the amount at which it is sold in the
United States.33
China's status as a nonmarket economy makes its firms easy targets for
ADs. 3" Chinese and domestic producers are likely to disagree over the
appropriate surrogate markets to be used for comparison, with the outcome
typically favoring U.S. producers.35 The constructed value of goods also fails
to properly account for any comparative advantage of Chinese firms in relation
to the firms of the surrogate country used for valuation.36 Comparative
advantage is a benefit of one country over another in the production of a good
28 See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (2006) (noting that "the valuation of the
factors of production shall be based on the best available information ... in a market economy
country").
29 Id. § 1677b(c)(4).
30 Id. § 1677b(c)(3).
31 Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., NMEs: A Love Story---Nonmarket and Market Economy Status
Under U.S. Antidumping Law, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369, 376 (1999).
32 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (illustrating the construction of normal value in order to make
a "fair comparison... between the export price or constructed export price and normal value").
" Id. § 1671(a); see also Peele, supra note 10, at 125 (noting that the amount of the duty
should not exceed the damages).
3' Kimberly A. Tracey, Non-Market Economy Methodology Under US. Anti-DumpingLaws:
A Protectionist Shield from Chinese Competition, 15 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 81, 84-85
(2006).
35 See id. (providing the example of the use of labor costs from Singapore to show the
disparate results reached by using market and nonmarket economy valuation methods); see also
Charlene Barshefsky, Non-Market Economies in Transition and the US Antidumping Law:
Remarks on the Need for Reevaluation, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 373, 375 (1990) (noting that AD
margins are typically higher in surrogate-country cases than in other AD cases).
36 See Barshefsky, supra note 35, at 375 (discussing problems with the nonmarket economy
valuation method).
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or goods as a result of lower opportunity costs" (i.e., the lower cost of an
input).38 China has comparative advantages in "flexible regulations, low-cost
labor, low trade barriers, highly skilled labor, and good transportation and
logistics."39 The use of comparative advantage has been demonstrated to
increase world production through specialization, which is beneficial to all
parties involved.4" This inequity that results from use of a surrogate occurs
because there is no provision for the consideration of lower input costs, even
if these costs were discernable." Another problem with the surrogate
valuation system is that when the surrogate does not voluntarily disclose its
input costs, the DOC may use the surrogate country's import prices.42 The lack
of predictability associated with using a surrogate's value leaves producers in
nonmarket economies to speculate how to appropriately price their products
so as to avoid ADs.4
The United States updated its AD laws in 1995 to bring them into general
compliance with the WTO Agreement on Interpretation of Article VI."
However, some issues are not resolved by this Agreement, leaving the door
open for U.S. interpretation, which may lead to disputes in the WTO.45
B. Countervailing Duties
A CVD, or a tax based on a countervailable subsidy, is levied to protect
domestic industries from unfair competition created by foreign subsidies on
imported goods.46 Subsidies distort markets,47 and the imposition of a duty is
"7 Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO's Two Step Test for Environmental Measures Under
Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 117, 120-21 (2007).
3 See Barshefsky, supra note 35, at 375 (noting that a lower input cost is a comparative
advantage).
3' David Orozco, Will India and China Profit from Technological Innovation?, 5 Nw. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 426, 432 (2007).
4 See Ghei, supra note 37, at 121 (discussing the traditionally held belief, advanced by
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, that international trade liberalization results in a net increase
in output).
41 See Barshefsky, supra note 35, at 375 (noting that the AD law does not allow for the
consideration of lower input costs in a nonmarket economy).
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the
United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMI'. L. 7, 35 (1995).
45 Id. at 35.
46 See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 545 (8th ed. 2004) (defining countervailing duty).
4' Letter from Patricia Mears, Director, Nat'l Ass'n Mfr., to Susan H. Kuhbach, Senior
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meant to rebalance the market.48 A subsidy is "[a] grant, usu[ally] made by the
government, to any enterprise whose promotion is considered to be in the
public interest."' 9 Under U.S. law, an industry is considered subsidized when
an authority:
(i) provides a financial contribution,
(ii) provides any form of income or price support within the
meaning of Article XVI of the [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] 1994, or
(iii) makes a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a
financial contribution, or entrusts or directs a private entity to
make a financial contribution, if providing the contribution would
normally be vested in the government and the practice does not
differ in substance from practices normally followed by
governments, to a person and a benefit is thereby conferred. °
Overall, the substance of this definition is consistent with that embodied in
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, though the
terminology within each definition differs to some degree.5 U.S. authorities
determine the existence of a subsidy without regard to whether the beneficiary
is a public or private entity. 2 To be countervailable, a subsidy must be made
to a specific industry, 3 but may be direct or indirect.5 4 Classes of subsidies
that are not countervailable55 are generally referred to as "green light"
subsidies. 6 Actionable subsidies, on the other hand, can be divided into two
Office Director for Import Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, at add. 1 (Jan. 12, 2007), available
at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/prc-cvd/cmts-011507/NAM-PRC-CVD-CMT.PDF ("WTO
agreements have long recognized that subsidies unfairly distort trade in goods.").
48 See Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economics
in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 993, 1009, 1014 (1995) (finding that CVDs distort the market but neutralize
the impact of foreign subsidies).
49 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (8th ed. 2004).
'o Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (2006).
51 Gantz, supra note 44, at 49.
32 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(C).
3 See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against "Unfair" International Trade Practices-2008,
SN 056 ALI-ABA 131, 154-55 (2008) (noting that a subsidy "must specifically aim to aid
identifiable firms or industries and not at [sic] a region or the country as a whole").
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(C).
55 Id. § 1677(5)(B).
56 See Irene Ribeiro Dubowy, Subsidies Code, TRIPS Agreement, and Technological
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categories: "red light"-strictly prohibited subsidies-and "amber
light"-subsidies that are not prohibited, but may be actionable."
CVD laws are administered similarly to AD laws.5" In order to warrant the
application of CVDs, an actionable subsidy must cause or be likely to cause
material injury to or materially retard the establishment of domestic industry. 9
If this test is satisfied, the Tariff Act mandates that a duty be assessed on the
merchandise, "equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy."' The
purpose of this provision, like the AD provision, is only to protect domestic
firms from unfair competitive advantage.6' However, material injury was not
always required for the imposition of CVDs: prior to 1995, a separate
provision in the Tariff Act of 1930, Section 303, did not require material injury
as a prerequisite to the imposition of CVDs.62 This provision was repealed to
bring United States CVD laws into compliance with WTO requirements.63 As
with ADs, the United States negotiated fervently with other nations to make
many of its practices count as the norm by WTO standards.' The concessions
made by the U.S. were generally codified in to U.S. law as the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act after the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations.65
Unlike ADs, CVDs have not always been applied to nonmarket
economies.66 This was made clear in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States
(Georgetown Steel), a case in which the Fourth Circuit upheld a determination
by the DOC that CVDs cannot be applied to nonmarket economies.67 Though
the holding could be interpreted to state that CVDs can never be applied to
Development: Some Considerations for Developing Countries, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 33, 43
(2003) (discussing the three types of subsidies under the WTO Agreement on subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, and noting that "green light" subsidies are "nonspecific" and
"nonactionable").
57 Id.
58 Lantz, supra note 48, at 1009.
'9 19 U.S.C. § 1671; C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, § 135.
o 19 U.S.C. § 167 1(a)(2).
61 C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, § 136.
62 See Lantz, supra note 48, at 1020 (discussing the history of CVD law and the repeal of
section 303).
63 See id. at 1021 (noting that the United States decided to repeal Section 303 and administer
CVD laws based on the Uruguay Round Agreements Act).
" See Gantz, supra note 44, at 48 (discussing acceptance of U.S. trade practices by WTO
parties).
65 C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, § 25.
' See Lantz, supra note 48, at 1023-28 (discussing Georgetown Steel and other reasons why
the United States historically has not applied CVDs to nonmarket economies).
67 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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nonmarket economies, precedent existed showing the application of CVDs to
centralized economies (e.g., Nazi Germany and Tsarist Russia).68 Problems
with applying CVDs to nonmarket economies arise because CVDs require an
internal "market-oriented benchmark," or, in other words, an unsubsidized
comparison."
There are also differing views on the ability of governments in nonmarket
economies to grant subsidies.7" One view is that these governments can grant
subsidies, but they must be measured in terms of "preferential treatment" by
the government toward a particular industry or organization, rather than asjust
a benefit from the government.7' The problem with this theory is that "a great
deal of government subsidization would not be countervailable" because of
difficulties in identifying market-oriented benchmarks.72 A second view is that
it is impossible for the government in a nonmarket economy to grant
countervailable subsidies because subsidies are too prevalent through the
governmental allocation of funds within the market and thus no particular
subsidy can be qualified.73 Additionally, if the means of production are
publicly owned, there is no "commercial benchmark"--the measure typically
used by the DOC to determine CVDs.74 The Georgetown Steel decision may
have seemed to prohibit the practice of applying CVDs to nonmarket
economies,75 but the DOC indicated as early as 1992 that Georgetown Steel
may not be a complete bar to such a practice.76 Furthermore, a 2006 DOC
determination in regard to coated free-sheet paper imported from China
effectively overturned the DOC's longstanding policy, thus allowing the
application of CVDs to industries within nonmarket economies the DOC
deems to be sufficiently "market oriented."77
68 Lantz, supra note 48, at 1029 (discussing the Court of International Trade determination
that Section 303 applies to "any country," including those with nonmarket economies).
69 Barshefsky, supra note 35, at 374.
71 See Lantz, supra note 48, at 1021 (noting that "disagreement has existed" over the issue
and "two schools of thought" have emerged).
71 Id. at 1021-22.
72 Id. at 1022.
73 Id. at 1022-23.
74 Id.
75 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
76 See Laroski, supra note 31, at 376-77 (commenting that the Georgetown Steel decision
may allow CVDs if merchandise is exported from a "market-oriented" industry).
77 Zhao & Wang, supra note 27, at 3, 20 (noting the use of "an internal market-oriented
benchmark" in determining subsidization).
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C. Nonmarket Economy Status
Because duties are imposed differently according to a nation's economic
classification, the classification of a nation as a nonmarket economy is likely
to be a point of contention. 8 The definition of "nonmarket economy" status
was first codified in the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988,"9 though the classification itself existed long before."0 Some critics
contend that the 1988 definition was not very helpful, noting that it did little
more than provide that a nonmarket economy is not, in fact, a market
economy.8 Current U.S. law classifies a country as a nonmarket economy if
"the administering authority determines [that the country] does not operate on
market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in
such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise."82 This provision
also indicates factors to be considered in determining nonmarket economy
status, including, but not limited to, the convertibility of the foreign currency,
the extent that wages reflect the free bargaining position of the parties
involved, the extent that joint ventures and investment by foreign firms are
permitted, the amount of government control or ownership over the means of
production, and how much control the government has over the allocation of
resources.83 The nonmarket economy system, however, has been described as
arbitrary at best.' There are manifest improprieties with both the
classification system and the valuation system for nonmarket economies. 5
On September 17, 2001, after almost fifteen years of negotiations, China
succeeded in its bid to join the WTO.8 6 During the process of accession to the
78 See Alford, supra note 27 (discussing many of the difficulties created by using the
nonmarket economy classification system and providing examples of how these difficulties have
resulted in conflict).
" Lantz, supra note 48, at 1004 & n.59.
'0 See Barshefsky, supra note 35, at 376 (discussing prior incarnations of nonmarket
economy classification).
"I See id. (stating that the definition is not helpful and that the bright line of classification
of communist countries as nonmarket economies is fading).
82 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (2006).
83 See id. § 1677(18)(B) (noting that the administering authority may also weigh "such other
factors as [it] considers appropriate").
84 N. David Palmeter, TheAntidumpingLaw: A LegalandAdministrativeNontariffBarrier,
in DOWN IN THE DuMps: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS 64, 76-77 (Richard
Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
" See id. at 76-79 (discussing problems with the "Exporter's Sales Price Cap" and noting
that the "comparison [of U.S. and foreign prices] is 'apples to oranges,' not'apples to apples' ").
86 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations
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WTO, China had to enter into negotiations with member states, often
conceding more than it was getting. 7 Specifically, one of China's concessions
was that it agreed to be treated as a nonmarket economy for fifteen years, after
which it would automatically acquire market economy status in regard to
ADs. 8' This bargain for nonmarket-economy classification has been criticized
as a representation of the "unfair results" reached by unequal bargaining
power. 9 However, the agreement does not act as a bar to the earlier
classification of China as a market economy if other countries so choose; in
fact, the bilateral agreement between the United States and China allows for
the use of Chinese industry prices in the determination of duties if the
investigated firm can show that it operated in a free-market environment.9"
This is consistent with the "industry-by-industry" approach to
reclassification that is also available to the DOC.9 The factors involved in the
DOC's approach are minimal government involvement in the determination of
price and output quality, private rather than public ownership, and that the
prices of inputs are determined by the market.92 Though the DOC may apply
market economy status to Chinese industries individually, it is not mandatory
that it do So. 93 In fact, the DOC has said that overcoming the requirements of
proof that a firm operates in a free-market environment would likely be
difficult.94
There are many problems associated with the United States' use of
nonmarket-economy status in addition to those already listed. For one, the
laws can be traced back to Cold War policies,95 with the inequitable outcome
of treating former and current Communist countries rigidly, while some
developing and more heavily regulated economies are treated as market
on China's Entry (Sept. 17,2001), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres0l_e/pr243_e.htm.
87 See, e.g., Tracey, supra note 34, at 82 (noting that "China agreed to be treated as a non-
market economy for 15 years following its accession into the WTO").
88 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, pt. I, § 15, WT/L/432 (Nov.
23, 2001) [hereinafter Accession Protocol].
89 Tracey, supra note 34, at 85.
90 Id. at 84.
9" See id. at 91-92 (discussing the market-oriented industry approach in both the WTO and
the DOC).
92 Id. at 87-88.
9' See id. at 84, 88 (noting that the DOC need not grant market economy status without a
showing that the industry satisfies the requisite factors but that, in 2016, all members of the
WTO will be required to recognize China as a market economy)
94 Id. at 88.
9' Barshefsky, supra note 35, at 378.
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economies.96 Further problems are associated with economies in transition.97
Despite significant market-oriented reforms in historically nonmarket
economies, it remains difficult to determine when a nonmarket economy has
transitioned into a market economy.98 Though the DOC could evaluate
industries individually, it has historically refused to do so. 9 As a result, the
DOC evaluates each country as a whole-an even more nebulous process that
is less likely to result in a determination of market-economy status. This
problem is especially true for those industries that are substantially market
driven, but that exist within a nonmarket economy.' °  These
problems-combined with those presented herein-present a compelling case
for reform of the United States' combined AD and CVD policy toward
nonmarket economies in general, and China in particular.
11. INITIATING ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTIES AND RECOURSE
The procedure behind applying ADs and CVDs can be divided into two
parts based on the regulatory body governing the procedure. First, there is the
procedure under U.S. law that includes the process of initiating and reviewing
duties.' Second, there is the WTO procedure, which lays out a process for
remedying unfair trade practices and a process for reviewing the fairness of
applied ADs and CVDs under domestic laws.'0 2 The WTO also has an appeals
% Id.
9' See Tracey, supra note 34, at 88-89 (noting the difficulty of the classification of Russia,
an economy in transition).
9' See id. (discussing the difficulties in reclassifying transitioning economies such as China
and Russia).
99 See, e.g., id. at 88 (noting the DOC's denial of market-economy status to a Chinese
menthol company due to the determination that "the country as a whole remained state
controlled").
"o See id. at 87-88 (discussing the factors for the evaluation of both a country and an
individual industry for market-economy status); see also U.S. GOV'T AccOUNTABILrrY OFFICE,
U.S.-CHNA TRADE: COMMERCE FACES PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING
COUNTERVAILINGDUTIES 10 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05474.pdf(noting thatthe
DOC could change China's status "in whole or in part," but has yet to approve an individual
Chinese industry's application for market-economy status).
"o' See 2 1A AM. JuR. 2D Customs Duties §§ 1, 54 (2009) [hereinafter AM. JUR. 2D Customs
Duties] (describing U.S. laws concerning the operation of customs duties and import regulations,
including the initiation of duties and review by the Court of International Trade, and appeal to
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals).
'02 See World Trade Organization, A Unique Contribution, http://www.wto.org/englishlthew
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process for reviewing determinations thought to be unfavorable. 103 This Part
will focus on providing a cursory understanding of these procedures under U.S.
law and within the WTO system.
A. Initiation of Duties
Under U.S. law, the procedures involved in initiating and reviewing both
ADs and CVDs are remarkably similar."' An investigation leading to the
imposition of either type of duty must be commenced upon the initiative of the
Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) or upon petition by an "interested
party" on behalf of the domestic industry, filed with the Secretary and the
International Trade Commission (ITC).'05 Once a petition has been filed, the
DOC notifies the foreign governments involved and makes a determination as
to whether the petition alleges all necessary elements of the claim under U.S.
law for imposing an AD or CVD. 10 6 If the DOC makes an affirmative
determination that the petition is sufficient and was filed by an interested
party, the Secretary initiates an investigation into whether any unfair dumping
or subsidy has occurred."0 7 The Secretary must notify the ITC of its
determination, whether affirmative or negative, and, in the event of an
affirmative preliminary determination, provide the relevant support so that the
ITC can initiate its own investigation.' The purpose of the ITC's
investigation is "to determine whether there is a reasonable indication of
injury."'0 9 If either the DOC or the ITC makes a negative determination, then
the investigation is terminated with no duties imposed."0 If the DOC
determines that dumping has occurred or that there is a countervailable subsidy
to_e/whatise/tif e/disple.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010) (describing the WTO dispute-
settlement process, including review of unfair trade practices and the appellate process).
103 Id.
' Compare Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2006), with 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (both
providing that the duty in question be imposed in an amount "equal to the amount of the net
countervailable subsidy").
los AM. JUR. 2D Customs Duties, supra note 101, §§ 210-211.
106 Id § 213.
107 See id. (providing that the Secretary of Commerce must determine "whether a
countervailable subsidy is being provided or if the subject merchandise is being, or is likely to
be sold in the United States at less than its fair value").
108 Id,
109 Id. § 214.
"o Id. § 216.
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and the ITC makes an affirmative determination of a reasonable indication of
material injury, then duties will be imposed."'
During the investigations, the ITC and the DOC must grant a hearing at the
request of "any party to the investigation" before it makes a determination.'
2
However, the ITC is only required to state the facts and conclusions of law in
its determination' 13; therefore, it need not respond directly to any arguments
that were brought by the parties during a hearing.
The WTO provides another means of recourse to perceived unfair trade
practices through the imposition of duties. The WTO settles disputes that arise
between member governments when one government believes that another has
violated a WTO agreement or commitment."' In fact, when an issue is
covered by an agreement or commitment entered into with the WTO, member
states have agreed to use the WTO's dispute resolution system to settle any
disputes arising from those issues."' The WTO Dispute Settlement Body is
responsible for the dispute resolution process, with its basis in the Uruguay
Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, also known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)." 6 This
process first calls for consultation, with an emphasis on a mutual resolution
between parties when possible." 7 This method has been successful to a large
extent, with more than half of the disputes either being resolved at the
consultation stage, or remaining "in a prolonged consultation phase."' If the
dispute is not resolved at this initial stage, or consultation is denied, then the
DSU allows the complainant to request the establishment of a panel." 9 The
panel is "normally [composed] of three persons.., from countries not party
111 Id.
112 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677c(a)(1) (2006).
113 Id. § 1671b(f).
14 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/
dispu e/dispue.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
"' World Trade Organization, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal_e/ursume.htm (last visited Aug. 1,2010) ("One of the central provisions
of the [Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU)] reaffirms that Members shall not themselves make determinations of violations
or suspend concessions, but shall make use of the dispute settlement rules and procedures of the
DSU.").
116 Id.
117 Id. ("The DSU emphasizes the importance of consultation in securing dispute
resolution .... ).
i18 World Trade Organization, A Unique Contribution, supra note 102 ("By July 2005, only
about 130 of the nearly 332 cases had reached the full panel process.").
119 World Trade Organization, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, supra note 115.
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to the dispute."' 2° The panel then renders a report on its determinations. 2 , If
one party is found to be in violation of a WTO agreement, all attempts are
made to allow that member to comply within a reasonable period of time as
determined by the Dispute Settlement Body in the WTO.'22 If that party fails
to comply within a reasonable period of time, sanctions must be authorized
within thirty days thereafter, "unless there is a consensus against the request"
for sanctions. 2 3 These sanctions are meant to be remedial rather than punitive,
and in the best circumstances should be mutually agreed upon by the interested
parties'24 An attempt is also made to direct the sanctions toward the same
sector of the economy harmed by the offending unfair trade practice.'25
These are the ways in which ADs and CVDs may be initiated under U.S.
law and WTO agreements. In the case of coated free-sheet paper, as well as
the more recent cases of trade sanctions against Chinese firms, the U.S.
initiated proceedings only under United States law, which is in violation of its
agreements with the WTO.' The remedies available to a party subjected to
U.S. duties in such cases are addressed below.
B. Challenging the Imposition of Duties
There are two ways for an interested party (typically a foreign producer) to
challenge the United States' imposition of duties: (1) the interested party can
challenge a final administrative determination in U.S. courts and seek periodic
administrative review; 27 or (2) the interested party can challenge the fairness
of the duty, or the fairness of an adverse panel ruling, through the Dispute
Settlement Body in the WTO.
128
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 World Trade Organization, A Unique Contribution, supra note 102.
123 Id.
124 See C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, § 136 (indicating that duties are "intended to
remedy disparities").
25 World Trade Organization, A Unique Contribution, supra note 102.
126 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the WTO requirement to use its
dispute resolution system).
127 See C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, §§ 167, 186 (noting the availability of appeal in
the Court of International Trade and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
128 See World Trade Organization, A Unique Contribution, supra note 102 (describing the
availability of review of unfair trade practices by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, including
review of the unilateral imposition of duties as well as an appeals process for review of duties
authorized by the Dispute Settlement Body).
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In the U.S., an adversely affected party may appeal the final determination
of the ITC to the Court of International Trade (CIT) and, barring a favorable
resolution, thereafter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
1 29
At least once every twelve months, "beginning on the anniversary of the date
of publication of [the] countervailing duty order," there must be a review of,
inter alia, the amount of the duty imposed, upon request by a party.13 Every
five years both the ITC and the DOC must review the imposition of duties to
determine whether the dumping or subsidy would continue to occur upon
revocation of the duty, and whether there would continue to be material injury
to a domestic industry. 3' This five-year review process is often referred to as
a "sunset" review, 3 2 because the duty would otherwise expire automatically.'33
Additionally, review may be granted based on a change in circumstances, but
the burden of persuasion in such a case lies with the party seeking a
termination or suspension of the investigation. 1
3 4
The WTO's process for addressing a grievance of one member against
another in regard to ADs or CVDs is essentially the same as the process for
handling other unfair trade practices-it begins with consultation.135 Similarly,
if consultation does not lead to a mutually agreeable solution, then a three-
person panel is established.'36 The panel's determination in either case may
be appealed by either party within a specific time frame.' The panel report
or the appellate body report, whichever is final, is then adopted and parties are
expected to comply with the recommendations therein. 3 However, the parties
may still come to a mutual agreement that has the effect of circumventing the
panel or appellate body's determination.' If the report is not complied with,
129 C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, §§ 167, 186.
130 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2006).
131 Id. § 1675(c)(1)(C).
132 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, supra note 13.
133 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (outlining the five-year review process for both CVDs and ADs
and noting that the ITC and DOC "shall revoke" an AD or CVD unless the five-year review
shows these duties are still needed to prevent further economic harms).
134 Id. § 1675(b)(3).
' See World Trade Organization, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, supra note 115
(noting that an emphasis is placed on consultations).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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sanctions against the offending party may be authorized (again, barring
consensus to the contrary). 4°
There are some problems with these review processes. Review in the
United States is limited and may carry, or be seen to carry, some bias toward
domestic producers for the same reasons behind potential bias in the initial
determination.' 4 The WTO, on the other hand, has no enforcement
capabilities and can only sanction retaliatory measures 42 that undermine one
of the fundamental purposes of the organization: to reduce barriers to
international trade. 43 Additionally, United States courts have held that WTO
decisions are not binding domestically.'" Moreover, only governments can
avail themselves of the WTO's dispute settlement procedures; in other words,
there is no private right of action. "4' Additional problems could arise if parties
decide not to comply with the resolution or to retaliate outside of the WTO
process, which could result in increased barriers to trade-contrary to the spirit
of the WTO agreements. 46 Despite the flaws within these systems, they may
be the only legal recourse for a nation confronted with the imposition of ADs
or CVDs by the United States.
47
140 Id.
141 See supra Part II (identifying the problems with U.S. AD and CVD law).
142 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1239-41 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (describing the process of
suspension of concessions, which is the only available remedy when a party fails to cure a
violation found by the Dispute Settlement Body).
143 World Trade Organization, About the WTO-A Statement by the Director-General, http://
www.wto.orglenglish/thewto-e/whatise/wt-dg-stat-e.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
'4 Robin Miller, Effect of World Trade Organization (WTO) Decisions Upon United States,
17 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2007) (citing Corus Staal BV v. Dept. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)); see generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 519-22 (2008) (discussing how the
automatic enforcement of decisions of international bodies under the auspices of treaties entered
into by the U.S. depends on the "self-executing" nature of the treaty and describing how a
determination of self-execution is made).
145 See DSU, supra note 142, art. 1 (noting that the dispute settlement process is only
available for "disputes between Members" of the WTO).
" See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the trade objectives of the WTO).
141 Some nations may have access to only limited review if they are not part of the WTO,
while other nations may have additional options if they are parties to other multilateral or
bilateral trade agreements that allow for alternative forms of dispute settlement. See, e.g.,
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Secretariat File No. USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Apr. 19,
2004) (remand decision), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/naftal9/1umber-injury-
remand-naftal9.pdf (providing a ruling on a trade dispute in a forum other than the domestic
U.S. and WTO dispute settlement regimes).
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IV. CHARTING A NEW COURSE
In 1986, the DOC seemingly decided that CVDs, as provided for by
domestic law, were not applicable to nonmarket economies. 4 ' The DOC has
since reversed this policy, stating instead that CVDs not only may be applied
to nonmarket economies, but further that CVDs are to be valued at a third or
(surrogate) country's market price, as with ADs.'49 The DOC thus set the stage
for the application of both ADs and CVDs to imports from a nonmarket
economy-a situation which was almost brought to fruition in the investigation
into the importation of coated free-sheet paper. 5 ' The decision to make CVD
law applicable to nonmarket economies was affirmed by the Court of
International Trade on March 29, 2007."' CIT's affirmation seemed to seal
the fate of the legality of applying CVDs to nonmarket economies under U.S.
law.5 2 The process was, however, cut short when the ITC determined that
neither the AD nor the CVD investigation showed that a domestic industry had
suffered material injury from the importation of coated free-sheet paper.'53
Before the investigation was terminated, China had already begun to seek
recourse through the WTO by requesting an initial consultation.'54 In its
148 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316-18 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
149 See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,484,
17,486, 17,488-17,489 (Apr. 9, 2007) (amended prelim. determination).
150 Id.; Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,758
(June 4, 2007) (postponement of final determination).
151 Press Release, Manufacturing.gov, Commerce Applies Anti-Subsidy Law to China
(Mar. 30, 2007), http://www.manufacturing.gov/news/033007_CVD.asp; see also People's
Republic of China v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007) (granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action to enjoin the application of countervailing
duties to nonmarket economies).
152 See Press Release, Commerce Applies Anti-Subsidy Law to China, supra note 151 (stating
that on March 29, 2007, the Court of International Trade held that Georgetown Steel was not a
bar to the application ofCVDs to nonmarket economies and that the DOC had "broad discretion
in this area").
153 Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, Indonesia, and Korea, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,892, 70,892
(Dec. 13, 2007) (final determination) ("[A]n industry in the United States is not materially
injured or threatened with material injury, and the establishment of an industry in the United
States is not materially retarded, by reason of imports from China, Indonesia, and Korea of
coated free sheet paper .... ).
"' Request for Consultations by China, United States-Preliminary Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, WT/DS368/1
(Sept. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS368/1], available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds368-1(cr).pdf (circulating the request by China dated
September 14, 2007).
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request, China alleged: (1) failure of the U.S. to allege specificity of the
countervailable subsidies; (2) failure "to make a proper determination of
benefit" to the Chinese producers from the subsidy; (3) failure to make a
proper determination of the value of the subsidy; and (4) failure to make a
proper determination of the amount of dumping that was alleged to have
occurred.' With the discontinuance of the investigation in the U.S., this case
lies dormant.'56
Since the March 29, 2007 determination by the DOC that CVD law is
applicable to nonmarket economies there have been no fewer than twenty-four
investigations initiated for the purpose of applying CVDs to Chinese imports
to date.'57 These investigations pertain to a variety of goods, ranging from
citrate salts to pipes.'58 Of those investigations, twelve have resulted in final
determinations of countervailable subsidies; all of those cases that reached a
determination of countervailable subsidies, have resulted in the imposition of
duties. 9 This occurred despite the fact that these issues had not been brought
155 Id.
156 See World Trade Organization, United States-Preliminary Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, http://www.wto.
org/english/tratope/dispu_e/cases e/ds368_e.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). The site states
that this is current as of February 24,2010 and allows for a more recent documents search, which
confirms the dormant state of this case.
' Import Administration, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations Initiated
After January 01, 2000, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html (last visited
Aug. 1, 2010).
"58 See Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed.
Reg. 26,960 (May 12, 2008) (notice of investigation) (indicating the initiation of investigations
into subsidies to the Chinese citrate salts industry); Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube
From the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,281 (July 24, 2007) (notice of
investigation) (indicating the initiation of investigations into subsidies to the Chinese light-
walled rectangular pipe industry).
59 Certain Kitchen Appliance Shelving and Racks From the People's Republic of China, 74
Fed. Reg. 46,973 (Sept. 14, 2009) (countervailing duty order); Certain Tow-Behind Lawn
Groomers and Certain Parts Thereof From the People's Republic of China, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,399
(Aug. 3, 2009) (countervailing duty order); Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts From the
People's Republic of China, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,705 (May 29,2009) (notice of countervailing duty
order); Circular Welded Austenitic Stainless Pressure Pipe From the People's Republic of China,
74 Fed. Reg. 11,712 (Mar. 19, 2009) (countervailing duty order); Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Steel Line Pipe From the People's Republic of China, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,136 (Jan. 23,
2009) (notice of countervailing duty order); Lightweight Thermal Paper From the People's
Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,323 (Oct. 2, 2008) (final affirmative countervailing duty
determination); Raw Flexible Magnets From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg.
53,849 (Sept. 17,2008) (countervailing duty order); Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires
From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,627 (Sept. 4, 2008) (countervailing duty
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before the WTO for consultations on the determination that ADs and CVDs
were warranted. 6 0
Though the remedies available to China under the U.S. regulatory regime
seem to have been exhausted, at least for China's claim that the DOC was
precluded from applying CVDs to nonmarket economies, the Court of
International Trade noted in 2008 that the issue of applying CVDs to
nonmarket economies had not been addressed in People's Republic of China
v. United States.'6' The court also did not make a determination in GPXInt'I
Tire Corp. v. United States, denying the plaintiff's motion for other reasons.'62
The court did indicate, however, that the holding in Georgetown Steel does not
act as a bar to the new interpretation of the Tariff Act of 1930 that allows for
these duties, deciding only that the previous interpretation was consistent
therewith. 16 3 The court intimated that there must be a new inquiry into whether
the statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the new interpretation is
reasonable."6 The issue has not yet been decided and is not likely to come
before the court until the duties come into effect and foreign firms have
exhausted all administrative remedies.
On September 19, 2008,just one year and one day after its request in regard
to coated free-sheet paper, China again filed a request for consultation with the
United States.'65 This time, the case will likely be resolved, or at the very
least, a panel or appellate body report will be issued, because duties have
order); Sodium Nitrite From the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of
China, 73 Fed. Reg. 50593 (Aug. 27, 2008) (antidumping duty orders); Laminated Woven Sacks
From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,955 (Aug. 7, 2008) (countervailing duty
order); Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed.
Reg. 45,405 (Aug. 5, 2008) (notice of countervailing duty order); Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Steel Pipe From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,545 (July 22, 2008)
(notice of countervailing duty order).
"6 Request for Consultations by China, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/I, para. 7(a) (Sept. 22,
2008) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by China, WT/DS379/1 ], available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds379-1 (cr).pdf (circulating a request by China dated September 19,2008).
16 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007); see also GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United
States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 & n.8 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008) (noting that the holding in
People's Republic of China v. United States "in no way resolves the matter" as to whether the
DOC had the authority to apply CVDs to nonmarket economies).
162 See id. at 1283 (dismissing the plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction).
163 Id. at 1279-80.
"6 See id. ("Georgetown Steel did not hold that the CVD law could never apply to NMEs...
but only that [the DOC's] decision not to apply it in that case was reasonable.").
165 Request for Consultation by China, WT/DS379/I, supra note 160.
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already been assessed.'66 China's most recent request for consultation is
significantly more elaborate than its previous request, alleging thirty separate
grievances.167 Among these grievances, in addition to those found in its
previous request a year before, were the "failure to inform interested parties
of . . . whether" there was a "double remedy" for the same harm in the
"simultaneous application" of both ADs and CVDs,68 failure to use the
WTO's consultation process,'69 "resort[ing] to a benchmark outside of China"
for the valuation of a subsidy,170 and generally an alleged lack of proof behind
the determination that duties were warranted.'17 These grievances all drive to
the heart of the problems with the simultaneous application of ADs and CVDs
against nonmarket economy classified countries, which will be discussed in the
next Part.
V. A PROTECTIONIST SIP THAT DOES NOT FLOAT
Having examined the substance and procedure behind the ADs and CVDs,
as well as the history and current status of such actions pending against China,
this Note will now turn to an analysis of the inequities created when these
measures are usedjointly against a nonmarket economy. In particular, this Part
will focus on double counting. This must be done with less-than-perfect
information about the prior and current cases because, as was alleged in
China's second request for consultation in the WTO, there is a lack of
disclosure of the evidentiary basis upon which the duties were calculated. 72
However, it can be shown that the method chosen by the DOC for the
application of both ADs and CVDs to nonmarket economies is very likely to
be inequitable, illegal, and, in trying to adjust for fairness, inefficient.
" Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic ofChina, 73 Fed.
Reg. 51,627 (Sept. 4, 2008) (countervailing duty order); Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and
Tube from the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,405 (Aug. 5, 2008) (countervailing
duty order); Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,955
(Aug. 7, 2008) (countervailing duty order).
167 Compare Request for Consultation by China, WT/DS379/1, supra note 160 (with each
subparagraph a separate grievance), with Request for Consultation by China, WT/DS368/1,
supra note 154.
16' Request for Consultation by China, WT/DS368/1, supra note 154, at (7)(g).
169 See id. at (7)(a) (noting "the US authorities' failure to invite China for consultations").
170 Id. at (4).
171 Id. at (7)(h).
172 See id. at (7)(g) (noting that the DOC did not provide enough information to determine
whether double counting had occurred).
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Article VI, paragraph five of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1947 (GATT), an international agreement on trade normalization, states
that no product "shall be subject to both [ADs] and [CVDs] to compensate for
the same situation of dumping or export subsidization."'73 This provision is
a means of preventing the double counting of subsidies. 174 While U.S. law
includes a provision that should eliminate double counting in the application
of both ADs and CVDs, 75 it is limited to offsetting "export subsidies,"'76 those
paid "only on products that are exported,"'17  rather than a "domestic subsidy,"
or "production subsidy," which is paid "regardless of whether [those] products
are exported," though the effects of both types on an importing country are the
same: the importing country's producers face a loss.' 78 Since many of the
subsidies at issue are China's domestic subsidies,'79 it is possible that a
legitimate application of U.S. law could allow for double counting. This
distinction will be elaborated upon in this Part.
As discussed above, in determining the fair market value in a nonmarket
economy for AD purposes, the DOC uses a constructed value based on the
input costs from a similar country. 8 ° Not only does this method unfairly
ignore any comparative advantage of the nonmarket economy country over the
surrogate country (e.g., cheap labor),' 8 ' it also ignores any domestic subsidy
the nonmarket economy may be giving to that industry. In other words,
assuming the only difference between the nonmarket economy and the
surrogate economy is that the surrogate country does not have the same
domestic subsidies as the nonmarket economy country, then the fair market
value, or normal value, would be equal to the cost of production in the
17' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
174 Zhao & Wang, supra note 27, at 34.
175 See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring that, in calculating
a constructed export price, the export price be increased by the amount of any CVD); see also
Marguerite Trossevin, U.S. Wakes Up to the Changed Chinese Marketplace But the New View
Won 't Necessarily Lower Duties Against "China Inc., "29 NAT'LL.J. 47 (2007) (noting that the
purpose of the law is "to avoid double counting").
176 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C).
117 Zhao & Wang, supra note 27, at 8-9.
178 See id. at 11 ("The effect of the production subsidy on the importing country is the same
as that of the export subsidy .... ").
179 See supra note 159 (discussing Chinese subsidies in various cases).
180 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2).
8 ' See Barshefsky, supra note 35, at 374-75 (discussing problems with the nonmarket
economy valuation method).
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nonmarket economy country plus the domestic subsidies to that industry. This
creates a higher AD than would exist if the normal value was determined by
values from the nonmarket economy, because a domestic subsidy results in a
lower normal value.
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Theoretically, this imposition of a duty would not result in inequity, as it
takes into account the unfair practices of the nonmarket economy in order to
"level[ ] the playing field."'8 3 The trouble arises when a CVD is also imposed
on the nonmarket economy: in the case of an export subsidy, the amount of the
subsidy would effectively be subtracted from the AD, but in the case of a
domestic subsidy, U.S. law may not explicitly require this action. 4 This
anomaly occurs in part because, in the case of a market economy, the subsidy
would have been factored into the determination when the normal value was
determined domestically.8 5
Such a result would be strictly prohibited under the GATT, as this would
be considered the same case of subsidization. 6  Though not strictly
prohibited, this situation would violate the remedial spirit of U.S. trade law as
well. 7 Despite the possible illegality of its occurrence, the likelihood of
12 An illustration of this principle is as follows: Country A is a nonmarket economy and
because of a government domestic subsidy of $1 per unit, it can produce and sell Good X for $4
per unit. Good X is imported from Country A into Country B for sale at $3 per unit. Country
B imposes ADs against Good X imported from Country A. Because Country A is a nonmarket
economy, Country B uses the industry of Country C, a similar market economy, for
determination of the normal value. All else being equal, because there is no subsidy in Country
C, the good costs $5 per unit to produce and sell. Country B thus imposes an AD in the amount
of $2 per unit on Good X coming from Country A.
183 See C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, § 146 (discussing the remedial nature of ADs).
4 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(c)(1)(C) (requiring an increase in the export price in the amount of
any CVD when calculating ADs, the resulting effect being a decrease in ADs, with the intention
of offsetting any export subsidy, though there is no mention of intention to offset domestic
subsidies).
185 See supra note 182. Notice that in the illustration, had Country B valued its AD using
Country A's domestic price (inclusive of the domestic subsidy), the AD would have been $1
instead of $2, but in the original illustration, if Country B also imposes a CVD on Good X from
Country A in the amount of$ 1 per unit, then the total duties on Good X from Country A are now
$3 per unit. This raises the price per unit in Country B to $6 per unit, higher than the price per
unit in Countries A and C. The price is higher in Country B because the domestic subsidy in
Country A is being accounted for twice, or double counted. It is counted first in the application
of ADs, because of the determination at a surrogate country's price, and again in the CVD itself.
18' GATr, supra note 173, art. VI.
187 See C.J.S. Customs Duties, supra note 3, §§ 136, 146 (discussing the remedial nature of
both ADs and CVDs).
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situations such as this reinforce the view that the United States is veering
towards an increasingly protectionist trade policy.' 8
VI. REMEDYING THE SITUATION
There are a number of potential ways to resolve the problem of double-
counting inherent in the current method of applying ADs and CVDs to China.
First, the DOC could change China's classification from a nonmarket economy
to a market economy. Second, individual industries could be evaluated as
market economies in situations where the DOC deems it necessary to impose
both ADs and CVDs. Third, when the DOC applies both ADs and CVDs to
a Chinese industry, it could factor out the amount of any existing subsidy from
the calculation of the AD. Lastly, a fourth option would be for the duties
applied to Chinese industries to be limited to ADs only.
Again, the DOC has the option to reclassify China as a nonmarket
economy. As discussed above, neither U.S. law nor WTO agreements would
bar such a change. 9 Though China has not officially requested a change of
status from the DOC, the DOC has repeatedly denied industry-specific
requests, 9° thus making it unlikely that it would approve a change of
classification of China itself. One reason for the DOC's refusal is the
difficulty of determining certain economic factors needed for an accurate
measurement of fair market value, due to the lack of transparency in China's
economy. 9' Another, perhaps more pragmatic, factor concerns the impact of
decreasing duties in industries currently subject to tariffs following such a
reclassification.192 Without regard to the merits of this reasoning, and without
"'8 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw& Phillip L. Swagel, Antidumping: The ThirdRail of Trade
Policy, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at 107, 111-12 (discussing the transition of U.S. trade
policy from guarding against unfair trade practices to protectionism, and noting that "an
unintended consequence of this evolution is that modem antidumping practice actually facilities
the kind of unfair and anticompetitive behavior it was intended to prevent .... Allowing
domestic firms to threaten foreign competitors with antidumping action makes it easier for them
to keep prices high.").
..9 See Tracey, supra note 34, at 84 (noting that U.S. law and WTO agreements allow China
to change its classification if China can satisfy the DOC's requirements).
190 See id. at 88 (stating that the DOC maintains a whole-country classification approach).
191 See Eid, supra note 26, at 66 (discussing the difficulties of assessing "import relief'
against nonmarket or communist economies).
192 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABIITY OFFICE, REP. TO CONG. COMM., U.S.-CHINA TRADE:
ELIMINATING NONMARKET ECONOMY METHODOLOGY WOULD LOWER ANTIDUMPING DUTIES FOR
SOME CHINESE COMPANIES 28 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06231 .pdf [hereinafter
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a change in circumstances, such as increased economic transparency, a
different outcome is unlikely in the near future.
Market-economy status could also be granted on an industry-by-industry
basis. Again, the DOC has repeatedly denied requests for market-economy
classification made by individual Chinese industries.'93 The same factors-a
lack of transparency'94 and lower resulting duties from reclassification-are
also likely influential in the DOC's decision not to change China's status to a
market economy. 95 Though it may be prudent to begin the process of giving
Chinese industries market-economy classification to ease into the mandated
market classification of China by 2016 for AD purposes, 96 without a change
in circumstance (such as an increase in transparency), this approach also seems
unlikely.
The DOC could also choose to maintain its current policy of applying ADs
and CVDs to nonmarket economies and simply offset one in the amount of the
other. The DOC is currently purporting to address the potential for double-
counting based on the facts presented in each case.' 97 If the DOC uses this
method of offsetting, an adjustment to the AD would be needed in order to
avoid double-counting. This adjustment would need to be in the amount of any
subsidy that is countervailed. 9 ' Such an adjustment, though effective, is
redundant because it simply calls for the valuation of something that is already
taken into account. Not only is it redundant, but it also has the potential to
waste time and money, not to mention legal resources and fees due to disputes
like the one currently pending in the WTO. This waste is exacerbated by the
GAO, U.S.-CHNA TRADE REPORT] (discussing the likely result of "reduc[ing] the duty rates
applied to some Chinese companies" after a reclassification of China to a market economy).
193 See Tracey, supra note 34, at 88 (commenting on the country-wide nonmarket
determination rather than a separated analysis of industries).
' See Eid, supra note 26, at 66 (discussing the difficulties of assessing import relief against
nonmarket or communist economies).
'9' GAO, U.S.-CHNA TRADE REPORT, supra note 192, at 28 (discussing the likely result of
lower import duties from a reclassification of China as a market economy).
196 Accession Protocol, supra note 88, § 15.
'9' See Press Release, Commerce Applies Anti-Subsidy Law to China, supra note 151 (noting
that the DOC "will have to respond to... concerns" of double -counting during the course of
its investigation).
' But see Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg.
60,632 accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at cmt. 2 (Oct. 25, 2007) (final
determination (discussing an alternate view that domestic subsidies might not be passed down
into price and ADs should not automatically be adjusted to take them into account).
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difficulty in ascertaining the amount of the subsidy itself, as well as the
necessity of using a surrogate country for this type of valuation.'"
Lastly, the United States could return to its policy of applying only ADs to
nonmarket economies. This option may not be the most equitable, but it is a
method that has a history of moderate success such that it is not as contentious
as other options, it is relatively easy to administer, it does not require a second
valuation, and it does not violate U.S. law or WTO agreements-at least not
until China's accession protocol mandates that China be considered a market
economy for the application of ADs.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Though ideally the valuation of ADs and CVDs would be more equitable
if China were classified as a market economy, such a classification may not be
practicable for valuation purposes because, as discussed above, many of the
business and bureaucratic practices in China remain non-transparent.
However, the alternative of factoring out subsidies from AD valuations is an
arduous and redundant task. The most practical solution to the problem of
double counting is simply to return to the previous DOC policy of applying
ADs, and only ADs, to nonmarket economies. This regression, though perhaps
not the most equitable, would yield a result that stays within the bounds of
both U.S. law and the WTO agreements, as discussed above. In any case, in
an effort to resolve the inequities caused by double counting, the DOC should
reconsider its use of the surrogate valuation system in applying both ADs and
CVDs to nonmarket economies such as China.
'9 See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,484,
17,486, 17,488-89 (Apr. 9, 2007) (amended prelim. determination) (discussing the DOC's
preliminary determination that the CVD law maybe applied to imports of coated free-sheet paper
from China and the use of an external benchmark for valuation).
2' Accession Protocol, supra note 88, § 15.
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